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Abstract 
 
This article considers some of the implications
for social welfare of bundling in the Australian
telecommunications industry. The practice of
bundling—offering two or more products for
sale as a single package—is a strategy used in
many industries. Although common, there are
circumstances when the practice can be used
anti-competitively. Yet bundling does not al-
ways harm consumers; at times, the practice
benefits both consumers and producers, and it
can even advantage consumers to the detri-
ment of producers. The general literature on
bundling suggests that its effect on social wel-
fare depends on several factors such as market
structure, the elasticity of demand for the prod-
ucts, the marginal cost of production, econo-
mies of distribution and the use of complex
menus. We consider these factors when assess-
ing the likely welfare effects of bundling in the
Australian telecommunications industry, con-
cluding that the potential effects of bundling on
competition and the information costs imposed
on consumers by complex menus of services
seem the most significant considerations for
social welfare. It is desirable that regulatory
authorities monitor developments closely, al-
though heavy-handed regulation of bundling
seems undesirable.
 
1. Introduction
 
The practice of bundling—offering two or
more products for sale as a single package—is
a strategy used in many industries. Although it
is a common feature of the supply of telecom-
munication services in Australia, there are cir-
cumstances when bundling can be used anti-
competitively. For this reason, the practice
may attract close scrutiny from regulatory bod-
ies. Yet bundling does not always advantage
sellers to the detriment of consumers; there are
situations when the practice can advantage
both consumers and suppliers, and other cases
when the practice may advantage consumers at
the expense of suppliers. 
From a regulatory perspective, the primary
concern with bundling is that a dominant sup-
plier may use the strategy anti-competitively.
In relation to telecommunications services, the
practice of bundling falls largely under the pur-
view of part XIB of the 
 
Trade Practices Act
 
,
particularly section 51AJ (2), which notes that: 
 
A carrier or carriage service provider 
 
engages in
anti-competitive conduct
 
 if the carrier or carriage
service provider: 
(a) has a substantial degree of power in a tele-
communications market; and 
(b) either: 
(i) takes advantage of that power with the ef-
fect, or likely effect, of substantially less-
ening competition in that or any other
telecommunications market; or 
(ii) takes advantage of that power, and engages
in other conduct on one or more occasions,
with the combined effect, or likely com-
bined effect, of substantially lessening
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Table 1   Competition in the Telecommunications Industry, 2000
 
(per cent)
 
Telstra Optus Other
 
Local retail telephony market (access lines)
 
a
 
85 3 11
 
b
 
National long distance 75 16 9
International 48 18 34
Wholesale mobile 46 33 21
Internet 24 8 68
 
Notes
 
: (a) Data were also presented on the basis of revenue and show a similar story.
(b) Includes resale of Telstra’s basic access lines including those resold to Optus. Telstra owns 95 per cent of the access
lines. 
 
Source
 
: Productivity Commission (2001, ch. 4).
 
competition in that or any other telecom-
munications market. 
 
The legislative focus, therefore, appears to be
on whether or not bundling has the effect of
substantially lessening competition. 
In this article, in addition to a qualitative as-
sessment of the competition effects (and re-
lated regulatory implications) we seek to
provide an insight into the likely effect on end-
users of bundled services, taking a broad set of
factors (such as cost effects, price-menu ef-
fects) into consideration. The bundling of net-
work elements and other services sold to
competitors is subject to the access provisions
of the 
 
Trade Practices Act 1974
 
 and raises is-
sues beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, it is important to carefully define our
terms. ‘Bundling’ takes place when goods or
services that could be sold separately are sold
as a package. We follow the lead of other re-
searchers in the field, using these terms:
•
 
pure bundling
 
: goods and/or services are
sold only as bundles;
•
 
mixed-bundling
 
: goods and/or services are
sold both separately and as a bundle; and 
•
 
unbundling
 
: goods and/or services are sold
separately.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2
presents an overview of the more common ex-
amples of bundled telecommunications ser-
vices that suggest widespread use of the
practice in the telecommunications industry. In
Section 3, we examine the way in which bun-
dling affects welfare. Section 4 follows with a
discussion of the regulatory implications of
bundling in the Australian telecommunications
industry from the perspective of end-users. In
Section 5, we provide some tentative conclu-
sions on the desirability or otherwise of regula-
tory intervention. 
 
2. Bundling in the Australian 
Telecommunications Industry
 
The 
 
Telecommunications Act 1997
 
 introduced
open competition in the Australian telecommu-
nications industry. In spite of the competition,
a partially privatised Telstra (the previously
government-owned monopolist provider) re-
mains the dominant supplier in most markets
(mobile telephony is an exception). None of the
markets, other than perhaps Internet services,
could be labelled as being near perfect compe-
tition. In most markets, an oligopoly structure
pertains. At 30 June 2001, membership of the
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman
(TIO) was made up of 59 carriers, 90 telephone
service providers, 51 providers of both tele-
phone and Internet services, and 889 Internet
service providers (TIO 2001, p. 21). These
numbers are continually changing. 
Market shares in different segments of the
retail telecommunications market during mid-
2000 are summarised in Table 1. The table
highlights the dominance of Telstra in the ac-
cess market and the local call market. In the
newer areas of the industry such as mobile
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phones and the Internet, Telstra’s share of the
market fell below 50 per cent. 
Bundling has always been a feature of tele-
communications markets. Under the govern-
ment monopoly, the only choice available to
customers was a telephone service that bun-
dled together the telephone handset, line
rental, maintenance, and access to local, long
distance and international calls. Today, cus-
tomers can make different choices for each of
 
Table 2   Examples of Bundling by Major Telecommunications Carriers, 2001
 
Service Consumer bundles offered
 
Telstra
Fixed service Offers different bundles combining higher access charges with lower call costs, options of different long
distance capped rates, capped call rates to Telstra mobile services at night and international call options.
An additional discount is provided to customers who receive and pay their telephone accounts online.
Additional options include: 
(i) 5 per cent discount on eligible call or Internet charges if two of fixed, mobile and Internet services
are on single bill; 10 per cent if all three are on a single bill, plus an annual bonus of 15 per cent of
eligible discounted charges.
(ii) 25 per cent discount on eligible calls between fixed and mobile services on a single bill (50 per cent
discount applicable if mobile phones are on higher monthly rates).
Mobile service At least 17 different plans combining monthly charges with different peak and off-peak call rates with
a choice of discounted mobile phones for fixed subscription period contract. Group plan available for
two or more mobile services combined on one bill featuring discounted subscription rates for second or
additional service and special call rates. 
Internet Several plans incorporating monthly access charges and hourly usage charges above a given level of
monthly usage hours (some with unlimited hours) that varies with the access charge.
Optus
Fixed service Three different packages combining equipment with varying access and usage charges to customers in
areas connected to the Optus pay TV cable network. Preselection of Optus for long distance calls (STD
and international) is a condition of service. Additional features may be added to the service. In other
areas, customers pre-selecting Optus for long-distance calls are offered resale of Telstra local services
on one bill. STD customers offered flat rates, capped per call charge and ‘free time’ on long distance
calls and calls to mobile phones connected to any Australian mobile network. 
Mobile service Over 20 plans combining monthly charges with different peak and off-peak call rates with a choice of
discounted mobile phones for fixed subscription period contracts. Limited free calls off- peak and week-
ends to mobiles on the same network.
Internet Several plans incorporating monthly access charges with hourly usage charges above a given level of
monthly usage hours (some with unlimited hours) that varies with the access charge. A five hour free
bonus per month provided to subscribers to other Optus services (a reduced monthly subscription rate
applied to unlimited hours plans).
Vodafone
Mobile service Seven packages combining monthly charges with different peak and off-peak call rates with a choice of
discounted mobile phones for fixed subscription period contracts. Limited free calls off peak to mobiles
on the same network and to fixed telephones. 
Internet Various plans incorporating monthly access charges and hourly usage charges above a given level of
monthly usage hours that varies with the access charge.
AAPT
Fixed service Bundle combining local call service (line rental and calls) with preselection for long distance calls and
calls to mobile services.
Mobile service Twenty or more packages available. Mobile services are provided through Vodafone or Optus and have
similar features to packages offered by those carriers.
Internet Two plans, one with unlimited hours of access for a fixed monthly subscription or monthly subscription
plus hourly usage rates above 11 hours per month.
 
Sources
 
: Telstra, Optus, Vodaphone, AAPT web sites and published material.
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the previously bundled elements. Nonetheless,
bundling continues to be a feature of the indus-
try, particularly in relation to new services, and
its use as a pricing strategy is widespread. 
Bundles may take one of two basic forms.
The first is the traditional packaging of two or
more goods for sale as a bundle, for example a
mobile phone and related calls. The second is
the discounting of aggregate expenditure on
two or more goods that a customer purchases
from a supplier, for example discounts on the
total bill for customers who purchase more
than one service from a carrier. 
Table 2 provides indicative information on
the types of bundling practices used by major
carriers and service providers operating in the
Australian telecommunications market. Gener-
ally, the services are offered as mixed bundles
giving the consumer a choice of a package or
individual components. Both bundling strate-
gies are common. Major carriers involved in
both fixed-line and mobile services markets,
appear to be seeking to exploit the consumer’s
preference for a single bill and offer bundles of
services in each of the two markets, as well as
bundles spanning both markets. Both Optus
and AAPT, for example, resell Telstra’s local
services to provide bundles of local and long
distance services. AAPT also resells Optus and
Vodafone mobile services. Vodafone, which
operates primarily in the mobile market, tends
to confine its bundles to that market. The likely
welfare effects of these types of bundling are
examined below.
 
3. The Welfare Effects of Bundling
 
The economic welfare effects of an action are
normally assessed against the competitive mar-
ket standard of efficiency that equates prices to
short run marginal cost (SRMC). There is an
extensive body of theoretical literature on bun-
dling and its welfare effects. We present here a
brief summary of some of the key issues that
emerge from the theoretical literature. A more
detailed survey of literature is provided in Pa-
pandrea, Stoeckl and Daly (2000).
Before beginning, it is important to place our
summary in context. The broad objective of the
 
Trade Practices Act
 
 is to ‘enhance the welfare
of Australians through promotion of competi-
tion and fair trading and providing consumer
protection’ (Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (hereafter ACCC) 2001b,
p. 3). To this end, part IV of the Act is directed
against anti-competitive behaviour such as
misuse of market power but part XIB, as al-
ready noted, is specifically directed at anti-
competitive behaviour in the telecommunica-
tions industry. While part IV focuses on the in-
tention of acts to reduce competition, part XIB
has the more stringent test of the effect, or
likely effect, of behaviour on competition (see
an earlier quote from the 
 
Trade Practices Act
 
section 51AJ (2)). In other words, regulatory
bodies are primarily interested in bundling be-
cause it has the ability to affect welfare by af-
fecting competition. Our interest is, therefore,
broader than that of some regulatory bodies;
we discuss the ‘competition’ effects of bun-
dling, but we also discuss other effects. 
Overall, the effect of bundling on social wel-
fare is difficult to predict. This is because bun-
dling can affect consumer surplus, producer
surplus (of the firm using bundling, and of
other firms), the pay-offs and strategies of
firms in oligopolistic markets, and the market
structure(s) of the bundled goods. The magni-
tude (and sometimes even direction) of these
effects depends on a range of factors including
the elasticity of demand, the marginal cost of
production, economies of distribution, search
costs, the market structure(s) of the bundled
goods, and the size of fixed costs relative to
total costs, and upon the number of effects oc-
curring simultaneously, and their interaction.
Assessment of the welfare implications of
bundling, therefore, requires identification of
which of these factors are most/least likely to
occur and a consideration of their effect on
welfare. A summary of the main factors influ-
encing the welfare outcomes of bundling prac-
tices is provided in Table 3. For example,
where marginal costs are low, bundling may in-
crease welfare and where they are high, it is
likely to reduce welfare. 
In addition to the factors listed in Table 3,
market structure plays an important role in de-
termining the likely welfare effects of bun-
dling. Its role, however, is a complex one—it is
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impossible to make a priori assessments of the
likely welfare impacts of bundling in oligopo-
listic markets without careful consideration of
the strategic interaction of firms.
 
3.1 Bundling, Demand and Marginal Cost
 
Stigler (1963) was the first economist to recog-
nise that when buyers have substantially differ-
ent valuations for products, a seller may be able
to exercise a form of price discrimination and
increase profits by selling the products as a
bundle, rather than separately. His finding was
extended by Adams and Yellen (1976) to show
that a multi-product monopolist could further
increase profits by offering buyers the choice
of purchasing either the bundle or one or more,
but not all, of the components separately. In ef-
fect, bundling allows firms to engage in price
discrimination without needing prior informa-
tion about the valuation that consumers place
on individual goods. This is because it reduces
the effective dispersion of consumer tastes (see
Schmalensee 1984) and because it is easier to
predict consumer valuations for the bundle
than for its individual components (Bakos and
Brynjolfsson 1998).
This facet of bundling—namely that it re-
duces the need for market research—is partic-
ularly useful in rapidly changing industries,
where historical information on consumer pur-
chases is only of limited value in developing an
adequate understanding of the direction of
change. All suppliers face this problem and
they tend to respond to it by changing their sell-
ing strategies. In a market with several suppli-
ers, the combined effect of changing seller
strategies and changing consumer tastes makes
it difficult to determine what might be the best
bundle/price combination. As a result, there is
an incentive to offer a range of bundles. Faced
with a range of bundles, consumers are forced
to self-select into the bundle/price combination
that they consider best meets their needs. For
the supplier, consumer self-selection is desir-
able because it exploits the pricing discrimina-
tion attributes of bundling and captures more
consumer surplus than a single bundle. 
In a first-best world, pure bundling is less ef-
ficient than unbundling, primarily because the
practice ‘confuses’ the price signals to consum-
ers, leading to an over-supply of some goods
(Schmalensee 1982; Kahn and Shew 1987).
The effects listed in Table 3 indicate that in
general, the less elastic is the demand for the
bundled goods, the less will be the welfare
losses, ceteris paribus. This is because bun-
dling will not increase consumption if demand
is inelastic. If consumption remains constant
(at some, presumably ‘optimal’ level), then
‘over-consumption’ (where marginal benefit is
less than marginal cost) cannot occur—irre-
spective of whether price is greater or less than
marginal cost. 
In general, bundling is also less likely to
generate substantive welfare losses if the bun-
dled products have low marginal costs, ceteris
paribus. More specifically, if bundling raises
the consumption of a good that costs little to
produce, then the cost of ‘over-consumption’
is low (as when consumers purchase ‘value
meals’ at takeaway shops, and do not finish all
of their drink). However, if bundling raises the
consumption of a good with high marginal
costs, then the potential for more substantive
welfare losses exists. In this context, marginal
 
Table 3   Key Indicators of Likely Welfare Effects of Bundling
 
Effect on social welfare
Factor Increase Decrease
 
Demand Inelastic Elastic
Marginal cost Low High
Economies of distribution Substantial Few
Pricing menus Simple Complex
Fixed costs High Low
 
Source
 
: Papandrea, Stoeckl and Daly (2000).
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cost is defined as the additional cost incurred
by a firm in producing the extra goods that are
demanded in response to the bundling strat-
egy. It is possible (although, perhaps improba-
ble) for bundling to increase demand to the
point where producers need to expand capac-
ity. If the extra capacity is only required be-
cause of that increased demand, then the long-
run increment to costs is an appropriate mea-
sure of marginal costs. However, if bundling
does not force the upgrading of capital equip-
ment, then SRMC may be a more appropriate
measure. 
To apply this intuition to the telecommuni-
cations industry requires information on the
elasticity of demand and marginal cost of sup-
plying services that are typically bundled. This
information is not readily available. A sum-
mary of the findings of several (mainly non-
Australian) studies of the price elasticity of de-
mand of telecommunications services is pro-
vided in Albon, Hardin and Dee (1997).
Although the individual estimates vary consid-
erably, there is consistent indication in the
studies that demand for fixed access is inelastic
(ranging from –0.003 to –0.096). The elasticity
of demand for other services varied but was
generally found to be higher than for fixed ac-
cess. For the purpose of the intuitive analysis
undertaken in this article, the direction of the
likely welfare effect of bundling can be gauged
from a broad estimate of the elasticity of de-
mand for a service relative to that for fixed ac-
cess. A relative ranking of the elasticities is
provided in 4. It should be noted that the rank-
ing is intended to provide only an ordinal indi-
cation of the elasticities and should not be
interpreted as an indication of their relative size
(that is, a ranking of 2 indicates that local calls
are more elastic than fixed access but is not in-
tended to provide any indication of how much
more elastic they are). The table also provides
a similar ranking for indicative estimates of
marginal costs based on the authors’ assess-
ment of the capacity constraints in the supply
of the services. 
The information in Table 4 can be used to
make qualitative assessments of the welfare
impacts of bundling. For example, the results
suggest that, ceteris paribus, there may be low
social welfare costs associated with the bun-
dling of basic fixed access and local calls. This
is because the demand for both products is rel-
atively inelastic, hence there will be little
‘over-consumption’; the fact that the marginal
costs of supplying additional services is rela-
tively high may be irrelevant. 
We can also note that, ceteris paribus, the
bundling of international and mobile calls is
more likely to generate welfare losses than the
bundling of fixed access and local calls. This is
primarily because the demand for international
calls and for mobile telephony is more elastic
than the demand for fixed access and local
calls. Consequently, bundling is more likely to
increase demand for international calls and mo-
bile telephony (to the point where their mar-
ginal value is less than their marginal cost) than
it is to increase demand for fixed access and
local calls. It must be stressed, however, that
these two preceding points assume that any
other offsetting effects (discussed in more
 
Table 4   Relative Ranking of Demand Elasticities and of Marginal 
Costs in Components of the Australian Telecommunications Industry
 
Service
Price elasticity of demand 
(1 = most inelastic; 4 = most elastic)
Marginal cost 
(1 = lowest; 4 = highest)
 
Fixed access 1 4
Local calls 2 2
Domestic long distance calls 3 1
International calls 4 2
Fixed to mobile 3 2
Mobile 3 2
 
Sources
 
: Price elasticities are derived from Albon, Hardin and Dee (1997). Marginal costs are indicative estimates by the
authors and reflect their assessment of the capacity constraints in the supply of the services.
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detail below), and/or other market distortions,
are negligible. 
 
3.2 Bundling, Fixed Costs and Economies of 
Distribution
 
SRMC pricing will not achieve full cost recov-
ery for the supply of utility services that typi-
cally involve considerable fixed costs. As a
result, second-best practices are common (par-
ticularly in telecommunications) and it is
against these practices that the welfare effects
of bundling may need to be judged.
First, where fixed costs are high, the market
may be second-best (that is, 
 
P
 
 > 
 
MC
 
) and bun-
dling may be welfare enhancing. To illustrate,
assume that product A is initially ‘undercon-
sumed’ (
 
P
 
 > 
 
MC
 
). It is then bundled with prod-
uct B—one that is, initially, consumed at an
optimal rate. The bundling increases consump-
tion of both goods, generating welfare losses in
the market for product B, and welfare gains in
the market for product A. In some cases, the net
welfare effects will be positive (see, for exam-
ple, Spence (1976, p. 218), who argues that if
there are fixed costs and if a firm can price dis-
criminate, then ‘the welfare aspects of the
product-choice problem are eliminated’). 
Second, bundling may be welfare enhancing
if substantial economies of distribution
 
1
 
 are
present. The greater the cost savings from bun-
dling, the larger the 
 
potential
 
 gains to both pro-
ducer and consumer. Who gets a larger share of
these cost savings, depends upon the relative
elasticities of demand and supply—the more
inelastic is demand relative to supply (or more
precisely, marginal cost), the larger the poten-
tial gain in consumer surplus relative to the po-
tential gain in producer surplus.
An important characteristic of the telecom-
munications industry, at least in the past, has
been substantial economies of scale in the local
network. Consumers of telecommunications
services may therefore benefit from bundling
of products for this reason. However, some
economists have argued that local telecommu-
nications are no longer a natural monopoly (for
example, Spulber 1995). In their analysis of
telecommunications economics and policy in
Australia, Albon, Hardin and Dee (1997) con-
clude that there is no firm empirical evidence
either supporting or denying the existence of
economies of scale. Technological changes and
alternative means of supplying services in the
local loop further complicate considerations. 
Without further research, specifically ad-
dressing the current situation, it is difficult to
determine to what extent high fixed costs are
present. Nonetheless, there is substantial evi-
dence of growing competition in some market
segments (particularly the central business dis-
tricts of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane
(ACCC 1999)), but not in others (sparsely pop-
ulated rural areas). This suggests that econo-
mies of scale are not a substantial barrier to
entry in densely populated urban areas, but
may be important in rural areas. The assess-
ment of welfare implications of telecommuni-
cations bundling may differ therefore between
urban and rural areas. On the basis of this dif-
ference, it is possible to conclude that, ceteris
paribus, bundling is less likely to be welfare re-
ducing in rural areas than in urban areas. 
There are likely to be economies of distribu-
tion in telecommunications that may result in
consumers benefiting from bundling. One ex-
ample is billing charges. The cost of sending a
customer a bill for two services is not twice the
cost of sending a bill for one service. There is
also some evidence that consumers prefer one
bill for all telecommunications usage, rather
than separate bills for different services. Com-
petitors have used this as an argument for the
declaration of unbundled access to Telstra’s
local network (see, for example, ACCC 1999).
It is argued that new competitors that are un-
able to offer a bundle of telecommunications
products will be ineffective as real competitors
with Telstra. The presence of economies of dis-
tribution should increase the social welfare of
bundling.
 
3.3 Bundling and Price Menus
 
The indicators listed in Table 3 suggest that
bundling practices which serve to simplify
pricing menus are more likely to be welfare en-
hancing than those which serve to increase
their complexity. This is because consumers
have expressed a preference for ‘one bill’, and
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bundling makes such billing possible. Total
billing costs may be reduced when the same
billing system is used for multiple services.
Consumers may also benefit from bundling
where it reduces the costs of searching. To the
extent that this is so, bundling may therefore
increase consumer welfare.
The corollary of course, is that bundling
which results in complex price menus may in-
crease the costs of searching for the preferred
purchase, thereby reducing consumer welfare.
This is because consumers need to obtain infor-
mation and learn about the quantity, quality
and price combinations offered by the various
suppliers. Evaluation of the alternatives, partic-
ularly when products are bundled, can be a
complex task, one made even more difficult by
the constant introduction of new products and
by deliberate randomised pricing strategies de-
signed to maximise supplier profits. Such strat-
egies reduce the ability of consumers to use
experience to better inform their buying deci-
sions. 
Many researchers have found evidence to
suggest that consumers make systematic errors
when attempting to assess the true ‘worth’ of
bundled goods (see Russo 1977; Capon and
Kuhn 1982; Australian Communications Au-
thority 1999, p. 10). Generally, this advantages
producers at the expense of consumers (Estel-
ami 1999), and in the extreme can lead to com-
plete market failure—as when complex menus
are coupled with asymmetric information (see
Kephart, Das and MacKie-Mason 1999). Yet
this loss of consumer surplus resulting from
complex menus may be only a short-run phe-
nomenon. MacKie-Mason, Riveros and Gaz-
zale (1999, p. 1), for example, claim that ‘while
there is a steep initial learning curve, decision
makers rapidly develop an understanding of in-
novative pricing schemes’.
While research findings indicate that the in-
troduction of competition in the telecommuni-
cations industry was followed by a reduction in
prices and an extension in the range of services
offered, it was also followed by increased com-
plexity of pricing menus. Muir, Jennings and
McAnally (1999, p. 124) argue that the exist-
ence of price differentials between suppliers
suggests:
 
either lack of interest or awareness on the part of
consumers of the ‘menu’ of prices on offer or else
the existence of real or perceived disparities in the
quality of the services themselves or their sup-
plier. Alternatively, consumers may believe that
the effort involved in identifying and evaluating
the increasingly complex ‘menu’ and the com-
plexity of switching service providers or using
more than one operator, may exceed the benefits.
 
While current telecommunications bundling
practices have increased the complexity of
price menus and may have imposed costs on
consumers, it is unclear whether this is more
than a feature of the transition from a monop-
oly to a more competitive structure. In other
words, it is possible that as competition ma-
tures and consumers become better informed,
firms will have incentives to offer simpler
menus as a means of drawing customers away
from their competitors. 
 
3.4 Bundling and Market Structure
 
One of the prime concerns with the practice of
bundling is the possibility that a monopolist in
one market may be able to use that position to
extend its power into a market for products
where it competes with other firms. Oligopo-
lists, in particular, may be prone to use bun-
dling as part of their dynamic strategies. A firm
with significant monopoly power can also use
bundling as a ‘predatory pricing’
 
2
 
 strategy to
substantially lessen competition. 
By selling the two goods as a discounted
bundle price, the incumbent firm can make it
more difficult for rivals producing only one of
the goods to enter the market without having to
offer a relatively low price on each of the goods
(even if the incumbent is not, strictly speaking,
using ‘predatory pricing’). As demonstrated by
Nalebuff (1999), the use of bundling as an
entry deterrent is at its most effective when the
goods are positively correlated (complements),
but it loses its effectiveness when the goods are
perfectly negatively correlated in value (substi-
tutes) (note that these are the converse of the
conditions for the use of bundling as an effec-
tive tool for price discrimination). 
When goods are positively correlated con-
sumers buy both goods and single product
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entrants are unable to satisfy the full customer
demand. The advantages of bundling as an
entry deterrent in such a situation are illustrated
in Figure 1, which shows the situation from the
point of view of the consumer. Assume that an
incumbent is producing two goods (A and B)
and sells them individually at prices above
marginal cost (monopoly pricing). A new en-
trant is seeking to enter the market with only
one of the two goods (say, B) at a price equal to
marginal cost (that is, it undercuts the incum-
bent’s price). The incumbent responds by of-
fering the two goods as a bundle at a price
equal to the marginal cost of B plus a dis-
counted price for A (equal to at least its mar-
ginal cost), as well as continuing to sell the two
goods individually at the original price. From a
consumer’s perspective, the incumbent’s re-
sponse is equivalent to offering a price below
marginal cost for B that the new entrant cannot
match. The incumbent, therefore, can deter
competition by any single-product entrant
without the need to match the individual prices
offered by the new entrants and can still extract
some of the original monopoly profits. 
The incumbent would be able to reduce the
extent to which the new entrant can compete
for its customers—that is, those purchasing B
only would be challenged, but those buying A
and B would not be contestable. Of course, in
this simple example entry of two or more
single-product firms could allow consumers to
produce their own bundle of the two goods
from two different suppliers and thus erode the
advantage of the incumbent. But even then, the
consumer would incur a cost in creating the
bundle, which would act as an incentive to buy
a similarly priced bundle from the incumbent
(for example, buying local calls from one pro-
vider and long distance calls from another).
Also, the incumbent would be able to benefit
from any economies of scope that may be
available in the production and distribution of
the two goods giving it a competitive advan-
tage over single-product producers (for exam-
ple, use of a common billing system for the two
services).
The other form of bundling—that is, dis-
counting—may also have anti-competitive
effects, despite the fact that it is usually consid-
ered a sign of vigorous competition. For ex-
ample, if not justified by demonstrable cost
savings, discounts on total expenditure on a
bundle of products that are complements, in-
cluding one in which a firm is dominant, could
have tying-like effects even though a customer
is not compelled to buy the goods as a bundle. 
To illustrate, assume that a dominant fixed
telephone service supplier offers a 25 per cent
discount on eligible calls (in both directions)
between the fixed service and a mobile service,
which it supplies in a competitive market. If the
consumer makes $10 worth of calls in each di-
rection his total bill after discount will be $15.
However, if he buys his mobile services from
an alternative carrier who provides a 25 per
cent discount on mobile to fixed phone calls, he
will only receive a discount on half his calls,
that is those made from the mobile phone to a
fixed phone. His total bill will be $17.50. A
competitor who supplies only a mobile service
would thus have to offer at least a 50 per cent
discount on calls on its mobile services to com-
pete for customers who are purchasing a fixed
 
Figure 1   Bundling as an Entry Deterrent
 
Incumbent price of A Incumbent price of B Purchase of individual goods from incumbent
Incumbent price of A New entrant price of B Purchase of A from incumbent 
and B from new entrant
Bundle price (incumbent)
Implicit price of A Implicit price of B Purchase of bundle from incumbent
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service from the dominant supplier of fixed
services. The effects are summarised in Table
5.
There is, however, a particularly interesting
twist to the story of ‘bundling as an (anti) com-
petitive device’: this is a twist, which can occur
when new entrants use bundling strategically.
In much the same way that an incumbent can
use bundling to deter or mitigate the effects of
competitive entry, a new entrant could be seek-
ing to secure an advantage over an incumbent
whose pricing strategies may be constrained by
regulation. Such an advantage, however, will
materialise only if the incumbent perseveres
with the sale of individual components. If the
incumbent responds with its own bundle,
strong bundle-to-bundle competition develops
and prices are rapidly driven down. The litera-
ture suggests that bundling by at least one new
entrant frequently provokes strong bundle-to-
bundle competition, generating a prisoners’ di-
lemma (Economides 1993). Rather than serv-
ing to ‘substantially lessen competition’ and
increase firm profits (as might have been the
intent of firms), this type of bundling lowers
profit, to the advantage of consumers. 
 
4. Regulatory Implications for the 
Australian Market
 
To the extent that bundling is being used anti-
competitively, it will lower consumer surplus
while raising producer surplus. However, as
discussed in Section 3, oligopoly bundling
need not be anti-competitive; rather, it may sig-
nal a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ which advantages
consumers at the expense of producers. 
Consequently, one needs to consider
whether Telstra, as the dominant operator, has
attempted to use bundling as a form of preda-
tory pricing to frustrate competition and deter
entry; or, whether current bundling is more
likely to have originated from new entrants.
Empirical information that could be used to as-
sess the motivation for bundling is not readily
available. The following assessment, therefore,
has had to rely on qualitative analysis guided
by general observations of market behaviour. 
Telstra is probably the only player in the
Australian telecommunications market in a po-
sition to use bundling in an anti-competitive
manner to maintain its market power or to min-
imise the impact of competition from new en-
trants. As the dominant player operating in all
telecommunications services markets, Telstra
would have had many opportunities to use bun-
dling as a strategy against competitors supply-
ing only a limited range of services. However,
Telstra does not appear to have pursued bun-
dling as an aggressive competitive strategy. In-
deed, there are several factors suggesting
considerable disincentives for Telstra to em-
ploy such a strategy.
At least in the early stages of market entry,
new entrants have typically supplied localised
geographic markets with a limited range of ser-
vices. Competition with Telstra, therefore, has
tended to be localised both in the geographic
and product sense. In a completely unregulated
market, Telstra could have easily produced a
bundle of services including at least one of the
services in which it is dominant (for example,
local call service). However, services in which
Telstra is dominant are subject to price controls
 
Table 5   Effects of Expenditure Discount Bundles
 
Bundled 
purchase
Unbundled purchase
Mobile supplier Fixed supplier Total
 
Mobile to fixed (dollars) 10.0 10.0 na 10.0
Fixed to mobile (dollars) 10.0 na 10.0 10.0
Discount (dollars) 5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5
Total bill (dollars) 15.0 7.5 10.0 17.5
 
a
 
Effective discount on 
  mobile to fixed (per cent) 50.0 25.0 0.0 25.0
 
Note
 
: (a) Includes $10 expenditure on fixed to mobile calls sourced from supplier of fixed services.
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and related regulation (ACCC 2001a).
 
3
 
 Those
controls limit Telstra’s scope to use bundling to
deter competition for several reasons. 
Assuming that price controls are based on
the cost of supplying a service, any attempt by
Telstra to bundle one of its dominant, price-
controlled, services with another service would
clearly signal the implicit price charged for the
other services in the bundle. The implicit price
is the bundle price less the regulated price for
the monopoly service. The inability of compet-
itors to match the implicit price would then sig-
nal the likelihood of Telstra cross-subsidising
the competitive service with the dominant ser-
vice. In that event, the ACCC would be quickly
alerted to the possibility that Telstra may be
employing predatory pricing against competi-
tors. There would be a risk, therefore, that Tel-
stra might find itself facing an investigation,
and possibly sanctions, by the ACCC. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Telstra would
be allowed to maintain and exercise its domi-
nance in the current regulatory regime. The ac-
cess provisions of the 
 
Trade Practices Act
 
allow for the declaration of monopoly or bot-
tleneck services to which Telstra must provide
access to its competitors on a cost basis. Local
carriage services have already been declared by
the ACCC for this purpose and so has access to
unbundled local loops. These declarations take
away much of Telstra’s monopoly power in the
provision of access to the local loop and the
supply of local calls. 
In addition to these regulatory-related con-
straints, Telstra would also face strong pecuni-
ary disincentives to engage in anti-competitive
bundling. While a competitor may be operating
in a localised market, price regulation pre-
cludes Telstra from implementing a localised
response to the competitor.
 
4
 
 Implicit losses that
it may incur from the ‘predatory’ bundle, there-
fore, are not confined to the local market sub-
ject to competition, but would accrue in all
geographic markets. These could be substan-
tial, relative to the potential local gains from
anti-competitive bundling, and much more dif-
ficult to sustain for extended periods. Further-
more, there may be longer term and ongoing
revenue losses. The formula used to control
prices has an inbuilt ratchet mechanism that al-
lows downwards movements only. Price in-
creases in any year are restricted to movements
in the CPI minus a factor for productivity
growth. Thus any price reduction on services
subject to price control cannot be recouped by
subsequent price increases.
New entrants on the other hand, have an in-
centive to better Telstra’s prices for the ser-
vices they supply. At this stage in the market,
Telstra has considerable ‘first mover advan-
tage’. For new entrants the chance of success in
a market in competition with Telstra is likely to
be small, unless they can supply services offer-
ing consumers a better price/quality combina-
tion than that provided by Telstra. Bundling of
services by new entrants in such a situation also
serves the purpose of confounding Telstra on
the individual price charged for the services.
By not knowing how to respond to individual
prices and because of the constraints of price
controls, the only way for Telstra to match a
competitor’s offering would be to offer a bun-
dle of its own with similar features.
Another important motivation for new en-
trants to bundle services is their limited infor-
mation on consumer tastes and valuations for
the services they supply. Bundling allows firms
to discriminate on price, even when they do not
have information on the consumers’ valuations
of individual products. Unlike Telstra, new en-
trants do not have historical consumer expendi-
ture information that can be used as an
indicator of trends in consumer tastes and are
thus at a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis
consumer preferences. In relative terms, bun-
dling may therefore be more attractive to new
entrants than to Telstra. 
As noted earlier, bundling also appears to be
partly driven by consumer preference for a sin-
gle bill. New entrants have been purchasing
line rental and local call services from Telstra,
for resale to customers being supplied with
other services. There are anecdotal claims that
some carriers are reselling these services at a
loss as part of bundle that includes customer
pre-selection of the carrier for long distance
and international calls. 
In the telephony market, the timing of
Telstra’s bundling tends to suggest that it may
be a competitive reaction to the bundling
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strategies of new entrants, with the intention
being to mitigate their impact rather than being
an anti-competitive manoeuvre to lock out
competition. To the extent that this is so, tele-
phony bundling may more likely represent a
prisoner’s dilemma situation, which is advan-
taging consumers, than an anti-competitive
entry deterrent or predatory pricing strategy.
The markets for other telecommunications
products (for example, data/Internet) are much
more competitive, and not historically charac-
terised by a dominant firm. To this end, it is
possible that Telstra initiatives to bundle the
Internet with other telephony services could be
an attempt to extend market power. As noted
earlier, however, this is difficult to do when the
‘other market’ is extremely competitive—the
leverage argument holds only when analysed
in a static context. In major metropolitan mar-
kets, competition in the supply of telecommu-
nications services is increasing both through
infrastructure investment by carriers and by the
impact of regulations providing access to in-
cumbents’ declared services and facilities.
Such increased competition will reduce the
scope for a dominant carrier to use bundling as
a leverage mechanism. In other markets, how-
ever, competition remains weak and prospects
for such bundling could remain a significant
factor for consideration. It would appear,
therefore, that the best option for policy mak-
ers and regulators might be to allow such prac-
tices (noting that there are potential consumer
gains), subject to regular review to ensure that
no single firm is gaining undue market power.
It may also be desirable for regulatory authori-
ties with access to industry performance data
to commission empirical research so that a bet-
ter understanding of this issue may be devel-
oped.
 
5. Conclusion
 
The aim of this article has been to consider
some of the welfare implications of bundling
practices in the Australian telecommunications
industry. There are many examples, including
packages of services and equipment and a dis-
count for consumers of more than one service.
The use of bundling has increased substantially
with the introduction both of new services and
open competition in the industry in 1997. 
Bundling can have different effects on social
welfare depending on a number of factors in-
cluding market structure, the elasticity of de-
mand for the products, the marginal cost of
production, economies of distribution and the
use of complex menus. The implications of
bundling for welfare therefore must be as-
sessed in each individual situation. This re-
quires extensive research to establish empirical
estimates of such factors as the elasticity of de-
mand, the marginal cost of supply, fixed costs
of supply and the size of the economies of dis-
tribution. It also requires an assessment of the
welfare costs of complex pricing menus and of
the dynamic effects of bundling on market
structure. 
Bundling considerably increases evaluation
costs for consumers. In the context of the Aus-
tralian telecommunications industry, the impli-
cations for social welfare of the development
of complex price menus are of particular sig-
nificance. Complex pricing menus increase the
difficulties faced by consumers in choosing the
best option for themselves. This almost cer-
tainly erodes consumer surplus—either be-
cause consumers need to spend considerable
time selecting an appropriate bundle, or be-
cause they select an inappropriate one, perhaps
on the basis of reasoning that the search costs
are higher than the premium. One way that reg-
ulators could assist consumers would be to pro-
vide comparative information on price menus
on a standardised basis. A more heavy-handed
regulatory approach in this instance would not
appear to be warranted, as it could stifle inno-
vation and may prevent the development of
welfare-enhancing price menus/bundles. 
At this early stage of the development of
competition in this market, the dynamic effects
of bundling should be the chief focus of con-
cern. If bundling could be shown to have the
effect, or likely effect, of substantially lessen-
ing competition in any telecommunications
market, then the practice would contravene the
 
Trade Practices Act 1974
 
, part XIB. The pre-
liminary conclusions presented here suggest
that the current practice of bundling is proba-
bly not against the Act. It is more likely to
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reflect a prisoners’ dilemma situation where
new entrants are forced to develop a bundling
strategy in order to compete with the incum-
bent, Telstra. In turn, Telstra has had to de-
velop bundles in the new markets of mobile
telephony and Internet access as bundling
emerged as the dominant strategy in those mar-
kets. The theoretical literature suggests that
bundling need not provide a successful tool for
leverage for a monopolist in one market at-
tempting to enter a new competitive market.
The literature, however, does suggest that in
some oligopoly situations bundling may be
used to protect market power against competi-
tive entry in the market for one of the compo-
nents of the bundle. It seems important,
therefore, that developments in a rapidly
changing sector such as telecommunications
are monitored for any potential long-term ad-
verse effects on competition.
 
First version received October 2001;
final version accepted July 2002 (Eds).
 
Endnotes
 
1. Economies of scope occur when two com-
modities can be produced by a single firm for
less than the cost of two separate firms produc-
ing one commodity each. But economies of
scope in production do not necessarily imply
that it will be cheaper to 
 
sell
 
 the goods jointly
or in a bundle. That is, there is a distinction be-
tween economies of scope deriving from joint
production, versus those deriving from joint
distribution, administration or billing (here-
after referred to as economies of distribution).
Although we acknowledge the importance of
economies of scope, we are, primarily inter-
ested in whether or not the savings can be made
if goods are sold as a single package (irrespec-
tive of whether or not the goods are produced
jointly). Consequently, we focus on economies
of distribution.
2. Predatory pricing refers to situations where a
firm uses its market power to sacrifice short-
term profits for long-term gain by pricing
below cost to deter competitive entry. If
proven, such behaviour is subject to severe
penalties. However, proof of predatory conduct
may be difficult to establish, particularly when
bundling is involved.
3. Price controls apply to a basket of services
and allow some movement in the relative
prices of the components provided the
weighted basket price does not increase more
than the permitted amount.
4. The local call parity provisions require that
the weighted average price of local calls in re-
gional areas is not greater than the comparable
price of local calls in metropolitan areas for
both business and residential users (ACCC
2001a).
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